Stockholm Agreement Jemen

The intention of the parties to take human rights into account when approving the Stockholm Agreement is essential. In view of the international crimes and widespread human rights violations that have been claimed by all parties, it is significant that, in supporting the Stockholm Agreement, the parties explicitly supported the „importance of dealing urgently“ with regard to the „humanitarian situation“ with regard to prisoners in Yemen and the basis of their agreement on „legal procedures and provisions“ , in particular the conventions, principles and norms of international humanitarian law [and] human rights.“ [30] The parties went so far as to involve the International Committee of the Red Cross in „ensuring respect for fundamental humanitarian principles and procedures“[31] and to recognize that humanitarian considerations motivated the ceasefire and the redistribution of troops in Hodeidah. The report outlines the conditions that enabled the Stockholm agreement and the obstacles to its implementation, including escalating tensions between Iran on the one hand and the United States and its Gulf allies on the other. It discusses the potential costs of the collapse of the agreement and the risk, but distinct, of a new cross-border military escalation between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, while offering political options to avoid those results. The report is based on field research in Aden, Riyadh, Muscat, Amman and Washington, including talks with the Yemeni government, the Houthis, the UN, the United States, the United Kingdom, Emirati and representatives of the Saudi government. Thanks to the presence of UN Secretary-General Guterres at the closing ceremony, the Stockholm agreement was enthusiastically announced as an important step towards the end of the war. The agreement has three components: the first relates to the exchange of up to 16,000 prisoners between the two parties; the second, a ceasefire and demilitarization of the city and port of Hodeida, as well as the two ports of Salif and ras Issa; and the third is the creation of a committee that works to de-escalate the fighting in Taiz. The whole document is only 3 pages long and it would be very difficult to produce something vague. The lack of detail and precision reflects the reluctance of both sides to compromise or seek a solution in the interests of the Yemeni people. The government`s interpretation of the agreement plays a good role among advocates who view the rebels as deceptive and capable operators, who use negotiations and agreements to reposition themselves before aspiring to further military gains.

[fn] The group cites as an example the 2014 Peace and National Partnership Agreement (EPA), which called for a gradual withdrawal of Houthi troops from Sanaa in exchange for a series of political concessions, including the formation of a new government. After the signing of the agreement, the Houthis ignored the exit requirement and argued that the men at checkpoints in the streets were not their fighters, but supportive citizens from autonomous „people`s committees.“ The Houthis propose a different version that suggests the slow pace of government formation, Hadi`s broken promise on shura reform (Advisory Council) and his attempt to pass a draft constitution based on a six-party federal division that the Houthis had rejected.